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FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE WATER LAW
FRxAwc

J. TRELEASE*

D RIVATE rights to the use of the water

of streams are generally recognized
as the creatures of state law, and each state is free to choose the form
that law shall take.' A state's law of private water rights cannot be a selfcontained unit, sealed off at the state lines, at which point the law of the
adjoining state takes over. Two factors prevent this. First, water itself crosses
the state lines or forms state boundaries, and what is done in one state will
have repercussions in its neighbor. Secondly, the federated nature of American
government will not permit such isolation, since the states are only quasisovereign. The Constitution gives the national government interests in water
and powers to implement them, powers in some respects superior to those of
the states, and the Constitution will not permit the states to act autonomously
where extraterritorial effects of such action may harm a sister state.
The national interests that are served by federal water resource programs
and laws are those inherent in the word "nation"--the use of the country's
waters for the free flow of trade and travel between its different sections, for
the strengthening of the country both internally and in its relations with foreign
nations, and for the conduct of its national business. The federal government
is one of delegated powers, and the Constitution gives to it powers to control
commerce, provide for the common defense, make war, make treaties, control
compacts between states, manage federal property, and provide for the general
welfare of the country. All of these have been used to justify water regulation
or resource development by the federal government.
The state powers to legislate in the field of water rights arise from the
general sovereignty and imperium reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment.2 The power to create property rights and the police power to regulate
them, stemming from this reserved sovereignty, are the sources drawn upon in
state regulation of private" water rights. State water allocation laws have
traditionally been directed to assigning water to individuals as property, in the
form of rights to divert or store water and apply it to beneficial use to further
the economic gain of the individuals. In the east most of this has been done
by giving unfettered play to the doctrine of riparian rights, but recently much
interest has been shown in reserving some measure of control in the best interests of the state and in preserving to the public certain rights to use the water
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. The research
for this article was performed as a part of the program of studies in water law undertaken
by the University of Wisconsin Law School in cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture, and is in part based on research performed by Associate Professor G.
Graham Waite of the University of Buffalo School of Law, who also participated in that
study. This paper was delivered, under a different title, at the Water Rights Conference held
by the Michigan State University Cooperative Extension Service at East Lansing, Michigan,
March 29-30, 1960.
1. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
2. U.S. Constitution Amendment 10.
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in place for transportation, boating, fishing, and swimming.3 The balance
between these public and private rights, the extent that private rights may be
acquired or exercised, the security given to private rights, the shaping of the
future development of water resources, are all matters of local interest with
which the states are quite properly concerned.
BDt the division between powers delegated to the United States and those
reserved to the states under our dual form of government is not always sharp
and clear. The state and federal interests will not always coincide, and their
laws may clash, where they deal with the same waters. The subject of water
rights is one of those peculiarly subject to all of the uncertainties raised by
the overlap of seemingly exclusive jurisdictions.
I.

THE COMMERCE POWER

The most important source of federal jurisdiction over water is in relation
to navigable water. This power depends upon a rather attenuated construction
of Article I, Section 8 of the federal Constitution, giving Congress the power
4
"to regulate commerce ... among the several States." In Gibbons v. Ogden,
Chief Justice John Marshall said that "commerce" includes "transportation"
5
the power to
which in turn includes "navigation". In Gilman v. Philadelphia,
regulate navigation was held to comprehend the control of navigable waters
for the purpose of navigation. The power to control navigation and navigable
waters includes the power to destroy the navigable capacity of the waters, and
prevent navigation, by the construction of obstructions. 6 It also includes the
power to protect the navigable capacity by preventing diversions of the water
itself,7 or of nonnavigable tributaries that affect navigability,8 or by preventing
obstructions by bridges0 or dams10 or by constructing flood control structures
on the navigable waters or on their nonnavigable tributaries or even on the
watersheds of the rivers and tributaries." The powers to prevent obstruction
in turn lead to powers to license obstructions.1 2 The power to obstruct leads
to the power to generate electric energy from the dammed water.' 3
Using this somewhat flimsy looking, but by no means shaky, structure for
a foundation, Congress has built a huge program of river regulation and water
3. See Ellis, Some Current and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern
States, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 237 (1958); Haber and Bergen, eds., The Law of Water Allocation
in the Eastern United States (1958); Water Resources and the Law (Univ. Mich. 1958).
4. 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
5. 3 Wall. 713 (U.S. 1865).
6. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4

(1876).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
Union Bridge Co. v. U.S., 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
Economy Light &Power Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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control. Buttressed by the general welfare clause0 4 and the property clause' 5
the federal program is the most significant single factor in modern water regulation and conservation. Huge multipurpose projects combining features of
navigation improvement, flood prevention, power production, irrigation and
recreation, envisage in many cases the development of entire river basins.
These federal powers may be exercised in three ways, affirmatively, negatively, and permissively. The United States itself may take affirmative action,
improving navigation channel and harbor facilities by dredging and constructing
protective works.' 0 It may build dams for the purpose of storing water to
provide a navigable stream by releasing the water during periods of low natural
flow. 1 7 It may build dams to protect the navigability of waters during floods
and to prevent the navigable waters from doing flood damage to the uplands.' s
Negatively, the United States may prohibit the interference by others with
the navigable capacity of water over which it may exercise jurisdiction under
the commerce clause.' 9 Permissively, the United States may license that which
it may prevent, or delegate to others that which it may itself do.
A.

Limitations on Power of State to Legislate

The existence of the federal power to control the navigable waters of the
United States has thus far not resulted in any prohibition against state action
vel non. The mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did
not deprive the states of all powers over navigable waters 20 and there is no
indication of any intention on the part of the Congress to "occupy the field"
and enact legislation so sweeping and comprehensive as to exclude all legislation on the subject by the states.2 ' Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized the vital interest of the states in the control of water resources, and has
specifically conceded the power of the states to exercise control over navigable
way
water for the interests of their citizens, saying that until Congress in some
22
asserts its superior power, such state action is not subject to challenge
It has said that a state may establish regulations dealing with its local
streams and also with the waters of the United States within that state in the
absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by the United States over the navigability of its waters. The states were said to have a "traditional jurisdiction"
subject to the admittedly superior right of the federal government to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce.2 3
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
Supra note 13.
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
50 Stat. 731 (1937), 16 U.S.C. 832(f) (Ft. Peck Project).
Supra note 11.
Supra notes 7, 8, 9, 10.
Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, 284 (1939).
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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B.

Limitations on the Applicability of State Legislation

There seems to be no case in which a state water right law has been so
closely restricted to navigable waters, as federally defined, that the entire statute
fell before inconsistent Congressional legislation.2 4 State water rights legislation
in the state's "traditional jurisdiction" is usually aimed at local problems involving many waters that cannot be called navigable by any test, or only by
the "state test", and hence apply to federal waters only by general inclusion.
An inconsistency with federal law may do one of two things: it may prevent the state law from being applied to the federal waters, or it may only
prevent the state law from being applied to a particular situation on those
waters which give rise to the conflict. The state law remains untouched in
form, and continues to be applicable to other waters to which the federal power
does not attach, or to other controversies in which the federal interest does
not arise.
An illustration of the first type of limitation was found in First Iowa
2
There, state
Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission.
requirements for licensing power projects and prohibitions against diversions
of streams out of their watershed were held to have no application to navigable
waters over which jurisdiction had been given to the Commission by Congress.
Yet, of course, the state laws remained applicable to local waters in the state.
In United States v. Rio Grande IrrigationCo.,20 the limitation was of the
latter type. That case involved a company which had appropriated water for
irrigation under state laws applicable to all watercourses within its boundaries,
but the particular appropriation was of such a large quantity that it would
have had a substantial effect on the navigability of the Rio Grande and the
required permission of the Secretary of War had not been obtained. An injunction against the diversion was granted, but this left the statute in full force
for all other streams in the state and applicable still to any other appropriations
of the Rio Grande that would not have the undesired effect.
Requirements of state law that a permit or license be obtained from state
authorities before beginning construction of water control structures have no
application to the United States when it constructs works on navigable streams.
Arizona v. California27 was a suit brought to enjoin Ray Lyman Wilbur,
Secretary of the Interior, from constructing Hoover Dam under authority of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act.2 8 California and other states were in the suit
only as necessary parties, since they claimed an interest in the waters of the
Colorado River. The state claim of control over the dam and water rights, and
the decision on these points are succinctly stated in the court's opinion:
24. Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, 328 (1939).
25. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
26. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
27. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
28. 45 Stat. 1075, 43 U.S.C. 617 (1928).
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"The wrongs against which redress is sought are, first, the threatened invasion of the quasi sovereignty of Arizona by Wilbur in building the dam and reservoir without first securing the approval of the
State Engineer as prescribed by its laws; and, second, the threatened
invasion of Arizona's quasi sovereign rights to prohibit or to permit
appropriation, under its own laws, of the unappropriated waters of the
Colorado River flowing within the state. The latter invasion, it is
alleged, will consist in the exercise, under the act and the compact, of
a claimed superior right to store, divert, and use such water.
"First. The claim that quasi sovereign rights of Arizona will be
invaded by the mere construction of the dam and reservoir rests upon
the fact that both structures will be located partly within the state.
At Black Canyon, the site of the dam, the middle channel of the river
is the boundary between Nevada and Arizona. The latter's statutes
prohibit the construction of any dam whatsoever until written approval
of plans and specifications shall have been obtained from the State
Engineer, and the statutes declare in terms that this provision applies
to dams to be erected by the United States. .

.

. The United States

has not secured such approval; nor has any application been made
by Wilbur, who is proceeding to construct said dam in complete
disregard of this law of Arizona.
"The United States may perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a state ....

If Congress has power to

authorize the construction of the dam and reservoir, Wilbur is under
no obligation to submit the plans and specifications to the State
Engineer for approval. And the federal government has the power to
create this obstruction in the river for the purpose of improving navi2
gation if the Colorado river is navigable ... ." (Citations omitted) 1a
Federal supremacy gives freedom from State licensing requirements not
only when the United States itself acts pursuant to its powers to control navigation, but also when it licenses others to do what it could do. The First Iowa
case 29 involved an application for a federal license to build a dam, reservoir
and power plant on the navigable Cedar River. The applicant had twice been
refused a state permit to construct a plant on the site, and the state intervened before the Commission. The United States Supreme court held that the
state's protests were unavailing, since the Federal Power Act was an instrument
of federal policy, disclosing a vigorous determination of Congress to make
progress with the development of the long idle water power resources of the
nation, by detailed provisions for a federal plan of regulation that left no
room for conflicting state controls.
It is, of course, possible for Congress to exercise less than its complete
power, and submit to state regulation as a matter of comity. For instance, the
Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Secretary of the Interior to proceed under
state law in the prosecution of projects, i.e., to take out a state-licensed water
right to appropriate water from streams on the public domain to irrigate public
28(a). Supra note 27 at 451.
29. Supra note 23.
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lands. 30 Although Congress might have chosen a theory of federal ownership
31
of the water and asserted federal water rights, instead it followed a long policy
82
of permitting state law to control the appropriation of western water, and
applied it even to water rights held by the federal government for federal
purposes.
The Reclamation Act has been applied both administratively and legis34
latively to navigable waters. 33 It was contended in First Iowa that Congress
had made a similar choice in the power field by Section 9(b) of the Federal
Power Act, requiring an applicant to submit to the F.P.C. "satisfactory evidence
that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State
or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed
and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power
purposes." The State of Iowa argued that this language clearly contemplated
a dual system of control and the exercise of appropriate powers by the state,
as well as by the federal government, as indeed it seems to. By what has been
3
called a "notable exegesis" the Court "read Section 9(b) out of the Act" 6
and held that the applicant need only submit evidence that was satisfactory to
the Commission of steps taken to secure state approval, but that actual compliance was required only with those laws that the Commission considered appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a federal license on the navigable waters
of the United States.
Although the Court said the case "illustrates the integration of federal and
state jurisdictions in licensing water power projects under the Federal Power
Act," the only "duality of control" found by the Court was a sharp division
of state and federal power, giving the United States final authority to issue
licenses on navigable waters free from any state veto over the projects and free
from the addition of state requirements to federal requirements.
Even though a power project is located on a nonnavigable stream, it is
necessary to file a declaration of intention with the Federal Power Commission,
which may require that a license be obtained if it finds that navigation or
commerce will be affected.3 6 It is possible that in such a case the state interest
in nonnavigable "local" waters would be recognized to the extent of requiring
both a federal and a state license. But since the federal government may exercise jurisdiction over nonnavigable streams to protect its navigable rivers, a
state project on such a river must yield to a federal project, and this may also
37
be the case where the federal government licenses the inconsistent project.
30. 32 Stat. 388, 390, 43 U.S.C. 383, 372 (1902).
31. See United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); cf. Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
32. Hutchins and Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Implications for
River Basin Development, 22 Law and Contemporary Problems 276 (1957).
33. See concurring opinion of Douglas, J., in United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 760 (1950).

34. Supra note 23.
35. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism, 45 California Law Rev. 604 (1957).
36. 41 Stat. 1065, 16 U.S.C. 797(e) (1920).
37. See United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 80 S. Ct. 1134 (1960).
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C. Limitations on State Water Planning
Most states now have some form of agency empowered to study the possibilities of economic development within the state and to make recommendations
or plans for the form that development should take. Few if any of these
agencies have literally set up a blueprint for specific action, but many have
attempted to indicate the general form development might best take and
methods of seeing that it is accomplished. Single purpose agencies concerned
with power, irrigation, pollution, and navigation have more narrow planning
functions, and any agency with powers to give and withhold permits for water
activities must have some pattern of development in mind. At a still lower level
of planning, legislative design of some sort is implicit in laws that encourage
or direct development along certain lines, or even in those laws that prohibit
some forms of activity.
But a pattern of development that appears desirable to a state, not looking
beyond its borders, may not fit into a federal development pattern for a river
basin, a region, or for the nation as a whole. Here again the state must give
way. To the extent that the federal plan is inconsistent with the state plan,
the latter is superseded, and if it were a truly comprehensive and integrated
plan, not only would the inconsistent features be eliminated but the remainder
might be destroyed.
There are a number of examples of federal action overriding state controls
designed to mold development into a pattern deemed desirable by the states.
Arizona v. California has already been alluded to.A8 In that case the major
complaint of Arizona was that the Boulder Canyon Act authorized a project
which when completed would prevent the state from exercising its right to
prohibit or permit under its own law the appropriation of water flowing in or
on its borders. The Couit" either did not grasp, or would not grant, that
Arizona had any interest in the pattern of future appropriation or water development. It disposed of the issue by ign6ring it, and based its decision on the
fact that no existing appropriation was interfered with by the dam, nor would
the Act prevent future appropriations of water that might be consistent with
the project.
Another aspect of the First Iowa case 39 demonstrates the supremacy of
federal power even more forcibly. The power cooperative's development plan
included a feature of diverting the Cedar River into another basin in order to
get a greater drop and head for water power. This project obviously ran head-on
against an Iowa statute requiring any water taken from a stream for power
purposes to be returned to the same stream at the nearest practicable place.
Rightly or wrongly, the legislature of the State of Iowa had decided that transdivide diversions were against the policy of the state, and that developers of
the water resources had to keep the streams in their original channels. This
38. Supra note 27.
39. Supra note 23.
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was held to be of no avail if the project, though violating the state precept,
furthered the federal objective of comprehensive development of national resources. "It is the Federal Power Commission rather than the Iowa Executive
Council that under our constitutional Government must pass upon these issues
on behalf of the people of Iowa as well as on behalf of all others."
The balancing of federal or regional interests against local and state
interests was forcibly brought out in Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.04 There
the state planning function was more in the nature of a land use pattern, but
there was in addition an unidentified water resource program. The state sought
to enjoin the construction by agencies of the United States of a dam and reservoir on the Red River for joint purposes of flood control and power production.
The project would inundate 100,000 acres of Oklahoma land, 3,800 of which
were owned by the state, it would displace 8,000 persons, destroy productive
farm land, stop the production and further development of oil resources, and
seriously injure the state and local taxing units by causing the loss of taxable
values and going concern values of the destroyed industry. The benefits of the
project did not compensate Oklahoma for these losses; it was alleged that most
of the power produced would be marketed in Texas, and the major flood control and navigation benefits would occur far downstream in Arkansas, and below
the mouth of the Red in the lower Mississippi basin. The United States
Supreme Court did not dwell on the congressional function, in authorizing the
project, of balancing interests within the entire region, and the obvious unsuitability of state governments to make such a regional decision. It simply concentrated on the aspects of federal power to undertake the project, and closed
its opinion denying the injunction with, "Since the construction of this dam
and reservoir is a valid exercise by Congress of its commerce power, there is
no interference with the sovereignty of the state. . . . And the suggestion that
this project interferes with the state's own program for water development and
conservation is likewise of no avail. That program must bow before the
'superior power' of Congress."
But a national interest need not involve a region larger than a single state.
The Cowlitz River, though navigable, lies wholly in the state of Washington.
That state's Department of Game had evolved a comprehensive plan for the
protection of anadromous fish (principally salmon and steelhead trout) which
had led to the legislative adoption of the Columbia River Sanctuary Act prohibiting the construction of dams over 25 feet in height on the Cowlitz or other
state streams tributary to the Columbia. The city of Tacoma applied for a
license from the Federal Power Commission to build two dams, 500 and 240
feet high, to produce power for its industries. The Commission found a critical
shortage of power existed in western Washington and issued the license over
the objection of the state that the river should be left in a substantially natural
condition for recreational purposes. On the strength of First Iowa, the state's
40.

313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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objections got short shrift from the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 41
D.

Effect on State-Granted Private Rights

Since state powers in relation to navigable streams are not completely
proscribed, most states treat them as they do other waters in granting or allocating private rights to the use of water.42 In the eastern states these allocations have been made principally by the recognition of riparian rights of the
holders of property bordering the streams, 43 in the west by permitting the appropriation of water to beneficial use. 44 Such state-based rights cannot rise
above the powers of the granting authority, and just as the state's powers are
limited by the federal supremacy over navigable waters, the private rights are
similarly limited.
The federal government may employ a sort of veto over the private water
right, and prevent its exercise when inconsistent with a federal power or purpose.
We have already seen that an appropriation of water may be prevented when
it would divert and consume so substantial a quantity of water as to affect the
navigability of a stream over which the United States has jurisdiction. 45 A
hydroelectric power dam that would constitute an obstruction to a navigable
stream cannot be built on the strength of the riparian rights flowing from ownership of the damsite or of the permission of the state in the form of a license
to construct the dam. The permission of the United States to obstruct the flow
and build the structure in the bed is also required, in this case taking the form
46
of a license from the Federal Power Commission.
The power of the United States over navigable waters has been said to
be a dominion over the flow of the waters. "That the running water in a great
navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.1 47 Thus, as
far as the federal government is concerned, whatever rights a state may attempt
to create in these waters are subject to its powers; these private rights carry
within them an inherent infirmity. This has been frequently expressed by saying
that the right is "subject to a dominant servitude148 or to "a superior navigation
'49
easement.
The most striking result of this subordination of private rights to the
41. Washington Department of Game v. F. P. C., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
42. Of course, states recognize variations in the rights obtainable in navigable as
against non-navigable waters, and exercise additional controls over private rights on the
basis of navigability.
43. See Arens, Michigan Law of Water Allocation, in Haber and Bergen, op. cit. note
3, at p. 377.
44. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, p. 37 (1942).
45. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., supra note 22.
46. Supra note 12.
47. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
48. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
49. Supra note 14.
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federal powers is that even after the United States has permitted a private use
to become established as a going concern, it may destroy the use by the exercise of federal power, and pay nothing for the loss of the concern. It need
not condemn the right, it merely exercises its easement, or imposes its servitude.
There is thus no taking of property.
In United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co.,50 the government

constructed a ship canal in the exercise of its power to improve navigation, and
in the process destroyed a power plant. The company's structures on submerged
land (to which it had title) had been built under a revocable license from the
Secretary of War, and the act of Congress authorizing the navigation works
ended this permission. The company sought no compensation for these structures,
but did seek to recover the value of the 18 foot head of water power available
at its site. The Supreme Court disallowed this, since the company had no right
of property as against the government in the flow of the river, and any property values in the flow came from the right to place obstructions in the bed, a
right held only on sufferance.
Similarly, the construction of a federal dam that backs the water of a
navigable stream up against an upper private dam, and reduces the head of the
latter and destroys much of the value of the power potential, does not give the
owner of the upper dam a claim against the United States.51 The power of the
government over the level of the water is plenary, and no rights can be acquired
by individuals to have the river maintained at any particular level. But if
the level of a nonnavigable tributary is affected, the riparian owner on the
tributary has state property rights to the flow of the stream and can claim compensation for their loss. 5 2 And where a dam on a navigable river does damage
to the fast land beyond the bed of the river, as by destroying drainage by
raising the level of the river, the landowner may recover compensation.5 3 Other
riparian rights "destroyed" by the federal activity for which it need not pay
are rights of access to navigable water, 54 and rights to place structures between
the high and low water marks 5
Most of these cases seem to be based on one of two theories, almost but
not quite opposite sides of the same coin. One is that the riparian owner on a
navigable stream has no riparian rights that the government must recognize,
the other is that the government need not pay damages for losses caused by
the effect of its operation within the bed of the stream. The choice between
these premises was forced in the case of United States v. Twin City Power Co.,50

in which the government sought not to interfere with some going use, but to
50. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
51. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).

52. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
53. United States
54. United States
55. United States
56. 350 U.S. 222
1134 (1960).

v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
(1956). Cf. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 80 S. Ct.
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condemn land for a federal project, land which had been purchased by the
power company as a damsite for a private project now precluded by the federal
project. The fundamental issue was whether the government, in paying the
fair market value of the property, need include values as a damsite, in other
words, pay for the special values due to the riparian character of the land. A
majority of the court seemingly adopted the first theory, holding that the company had no vested right in the water of the river, and the riparian rights
recognized by state law created no private claim to navigable waters in the
public domain. Four dissenting judges argued that the powers over navigation
have "crystallized in terms of a servitude over the bed of the stream," and the
United States was not here exercising its powers "within the limits of the
servitude," but was rather taking fast land that clearly had a special locational
value.
From the foregoing it could be argued that the supremacy of the federal
powers over private rights to the use of navigable waters is constitutionally
absolute, but one limitation has been suggested. In United States v. Gerlach
Livestock Co.,7 it was urged that the government, by constructing a multipurpose water control project on a navigable stream, did not have to pay for
irrigation water rights destroyed by the project. The giant Central Valley
Project in California was a joint undertaking of the Corps of Engineers acting
under the power to control navigable water and the Bureau of Reclamation
operating under the reclamation laws. The project literally dried up the river,
putting an end to natural irrigation of riparian land by seasonal overflows, rights
which had received recognition from the California courts. The waters were
sold for the irrigation of other lands, and the owners of the riparian lands suedfor compensation. The United States Supreme Court found in the authorizing
legislation an intent that the projects were to be governed by the Reclamation
Act 58 which requires condemnation of and payment for any water rights taken
in aid of a reclamation project. Thus the court never reached the constitutional
issue, but the opinion states, "... . we need not ponder whether by virtue of a
highly fictional navigation purpose, the Government could destroy the flow of
a navigable stream and carry away its waters for sale to private interests without compensation to those deprived of them. We have never held that or anything like it... ." Mr. justice Douglas, concurring, thought the constitutional
power to take the water rights without compensation was clear.
The Gerlach case is important for its doctrine that Congress may use
less than all its powers, and that it may elect to recognize state-created rights
and pay for them if it takes them. In a number of quite different settings, the
Court has similarly held that the United States need not insist on exercising the
navigation servitude and may assign values to private rights in navigable
waters. We have already seen that the government may exercise its powers
57. Supra note 14.
58.

32 Stat. 388, § 7, 43 U.S.C. 421 (1902).
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over navigable waters by delegating them to licensees, but in so doing, the
Federal Power Act does not give the licensee the government's powers to destroy
the riparian rights of others. If a licensee's dam will destroy the the head of an
upstream dam, the owner of the latter may enjoin such uncompensated de00
struction, 9 though the United States itself may wreak just such damage.
And though the United States might in the first instance take or prevent the
exercise of riparian power rights, 01 if it grants a license under the Power Act
and then recaptures the plant it will pay an amount that includes the investment
of the licensee in state water rights. 2
Indeed, Congress has gone farther and reversed the servitude, in relation
to certain western streams that are the source of water for irrigation on which
the regional economy depends. In consenting to some interstate compacts apportioning the waters between western states, Congress has declared that the
United States recognizes that beneficial consumptive use is of paramount importance to the development of the river basins, and "will recognize" any valid
established use for domestic and irrigation purposes which might be impaired
by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the rivers.5 3 And in connection with
the large multipurpose projects in western states, the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment to the Flood Control Act of 19444 provides that in the operation
of the projects the use of water for navigation will be subordinate to present
and future beneficial consumptive uses-in other words, irrigation ditches will
never be closed to provide water to float barges. This provision has been in05
corporated into subsequent rivers and harbors and flood control acts.
II.

OTHER FEDERAL POWERS

The power to control navigable waters is by far the most important base
upon which federal water development and control is rested, in the sense of the
overall picture of what has been done by the government in the water field.
The other powers occasionally called upon to justify federal action are quantitively less significant, but will of course loom large in the particular case. The
law relating to these other sources of federal water jurisdiction is less well developed than the law relating to navigation and its extensions, and it will not
be necessary to divide the discussion of each into its effects on state laws, plans
and private water rights. For the most part these effects are quite similar, in
their overriding nature, to the effect of the exercise of the commerce power.
59. Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fiber Co., 280 U.S. 369 (1930).
60. Supra note 51.
61. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v.
Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
62. Niagara Mohawk Power Co. v. F. P. C., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
63. Republication River Compact, 57 Stat. 86 (1943); Belle Fourche Compact, 58
Stat. 94 (1944).
64. 58 Stat. 888 § 1(b), 33 U.S.C. 701-1 (1944).
65. Water Resources Law 111 (1950).
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A.

ProprietaryPowers

There are two sources of federal authority over water arising out of its
presence on land owned by the national government within the boundaries of
the states. The United States has legislative powers over some areas, and
special proprietary rights in other tracts, whether owned as part of the public
domain or acquired for the performance of governmental functions.
The Constitution gives exclusive legislative jurisdiction to the federal
government over all places acquired by the United States, 6 with the consent of
the state concerned, for federal works. In many instances the federal government exercises less than exclusive power, and the states have a concurrent or
partial jurisdiction under the terms of specific or general limitations or conditions upon the authority ceded by them.6 7 The laws established by Congress
for these federal enclaves are of minor importance to this study, although the
federal jurisdiction over large areas of lands, such as the national parks, would
displace state water laws in these areas. 8 Vested water rights acquired prior
to transfer of the land to park status are preserved by special legislation. 69
Far more important are the areas, large in total, that the federal government owns as a proprietor, and upon which it exercises governmental functions. 70
Here the important question is not the power of the federal government to
legislate for the control of persons within these areas, but the extent to which
the federal government, in performing its functions, is subject to state regulations. The United States is not an ordinary landowner, it has special powers
and immunities with respect to its real property, and to the operations it carries
out on that property, which are not possessed by ordinary landowners.
In general these special powers and immunities spring from either the
Property Clause: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,"71 or the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution: "This Constitution, and Laws of United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 72 The factor that distinguishes the United States from other landowners is its right to perform the
functions delegated to it by the Constitution free from interference from any
source.
The case that brought this doctrine to the forefront in water matters was
66. U.S. Constitution Art. I , § 8.
67. See jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States (U.S. 1956).
68. E.g., 56 Stat. 259, 16 U.S.C. 403(h) (3) (1942) (Shenandoah and Great Smoky
Parks).
69. E.g., 44 Stat. 714, 16 U.S.C. 196 (1926); 45 Stat. 1536, 16 U.S.C. 198 (1929)
(Rocky Mountain Park).
70. All federal properties and functions are held or exercised in a governmental rather
than a proprietary or private capacity. Op. dt. supra note 67, p. 10.
71. U.S. Constitution Art. IV, § 3.
72. U.S. Constitution Art. VI.
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Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,73 which has come to be known as the
"Pelton Dam case." The Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a license from
the Federal Power Commission to a private power company to build a dam
across the Deschutes River in Oregon, over the protests of that state, which
had refused to issue a state license because the proposed dam would interfere
with the migration of salmon and steelhead. The Deschutes River is clearly
nonnavigable, and the authority of the Federal Power Commission was rested
on the basis that the dam would be constructed on federal lands-on one side
of the river an Indian reservation, on the other a power site reservation made
in 1909. The Court said that the property clause of the Constitution gave the
federal government the right to issue the license without the concurrence of
the State. Oregon claimed that the waters sought to be impounded by the dam
were under exclusive state control, relying primarily on the Desert Land Act of
1877,74 which had been construed as severing the water from western federal
public lands and subjecting all nonnavigable water to the laws of the states
and territories.75 But this act, the court held, was not applicable to the lands
before it because they were "reservations," not "public lands" which are lands
open for sale and disposition to the public.
Although the Pelton case raised a storm of protest in the west, because of
the threat to the security of irrigation appropriations that might be deprived of
water by extensions of the doctrine, the case had actually been foreshadowed
a half a century earlier by the Rio Grande case discussed above. That decision
was based on the power over navigation, as pointed out, but in dictum the
court noted that the United States owned much of the land riparian to the
river, and said that a state could not, without congressional consent, "destroy
the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream,
to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the
76
beneficial uses of the governmental property.
Since the Pelton case, the government has attempted in several situations
to extend its doctrine, and two such cases have come before the United States
77
District Courts. The first of these is United States v. Fallbrook Utility District,
which involved a claim by the United States that it owned "paramount" rights
to the waters of the stream running through Camp Pendleton, a Marine Corps
base in California. One phase of the litigation arose from the claim of the
United States that it might use water in excess of the riparian right attached
to the ranch that had been condemned for the base. The California federal
court decided that the United States was the owner of the unappropriated water
in the stream, by virtue of its ownership of the lands acquired for the base, and
of public lands in the watershed from which the stream arose, but held that
73. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
74. 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. 321 (1877).
75. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
76. Supra note 22 at 703.
77. 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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only Congress could authorize an agency of the United States to make use of
such water, and hence that executive officials of the Navy Department could not
initiate such a use on their own motion. But in Nevada ex. rel. Shamberger v.
United States, 78 the district court for Nevada held that the commanding officer
of the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot need not comply with Nevada laws
regulating the drilling of wells and the withdrawal of water from underground
basins. In this respect, the case is directly contra to Fallbrook, since no congressional authorization was relied on. Rather, the Court held that the federal
government was not compelled to "bend its knee" to state laws that might
impede the lawful functions of the Department of the Navy in the management
of a major military installation.
Still another type of proprietary right has been claimed by the federal
government in reference to Indian reservations, lands held by the government
in trust for the tribes. The creation of a reservation, whether by treaty or by
executive order, reserves with the land such water as may be needed for the
adequate development of that land. The United States, as trustee for the
tribes, can develop the water resources of the reservation free from state water
law, and without regard to inconsistent water rights established under state
79
law.
The property clause also finds employment as the connecting link between the authority of the United States under the Commerce Clause and the
production of hydroelectric power at federal dams. If Congress can control the
flow of a river in aid of commerce, it can control the water power inherent in
that flow. This was hinted at as early as 1898,80 but was spelled out in Askwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,8 1 in 1936. It was objected that the government could not enter into a deliberate plan to generate and sell electricity at
a dam constructed primarily for navigation control. The Court said:
"The Government acquired full title to the damsite with all riparian rights. The power of falling water was an inevitable incident
of the construction of the dam. That water power came into the exclusive control of the Federal Government. The mechanical energy
was convertible into electric energy, and the electric energy thus produced, constitute property belonging to the United States.
Authority to dispose of property constitutionally acquired by the
United States is expressly granted to Congress by Sec. 3 of Article IV
of the Constitution.... The Government could sell or lease and fix the
terms.81a
B.

War Power

The federal constitution gives to Congress the power to declare war and
to levy taxes and appropriate money to provide for the common defense of the
78. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D.C. Nev. 1958).
79. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
80. Green Bay &Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58 (1898).
81. Supra note 13.
81(a). Id. at 330.
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United States. 12 Some phases of federal resource development have been hinged
on this power. The most notable was the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals on the
Tennessee River, begun in 1917 and later incorporated into the system of the
T.V.A.
Under the 1916 National Defense Act, Congress authorized the president
to investigate the best means for the production of nitrates and other products
for munitions of war, and to designate such sites on rivers and public lands as
he deemed best suited for generation of power for the production of nitrates
and other useful products. The Wilson Dam was constructed under this authority and, in peacetime, its hydroelectric energy was sold for distribution in
the Tennessee Valley area. This arrangement was challenged in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,83 but was upheld by the Supreme Court. Taking
judicial notice of the international situation in 1916, the court concluded that
the Wilson Dam and power plant were "adapted to the purposes of national
defense," and that the maintenance of these properties in operating condition,
and the resulting assurance of an abundance of electric energy in the event of
war, were national defense assets which the government might constitutionally
construct and acquire.
The exercise of the war power has not been undertaken in such a way
as to bring its resource development projects into direct conflict with state
water laws or water rights. Normally, property taken for national defense
purposes is condemned under the power of eminent domain. But when it is
coupled with the power to control the property of the United States, and the
nation uses its public domain or acquires private land for national defense installations, state laws may be superseded and private water rights could be
preempted.
No direct expropriation of water rights has taken place, but the lower
federal courts have held that the military can take such water as it needs for a
camp or an ammunition depot, without compliance with state water law that
might interfere with the management of the property in the best interests of
defense.8 4
C. Treaty Power
Treaties, made by the president and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate,85 are together with the federal constitution and laws "the supreme Law of the Land."8 6 The presence of a water boundary between Canada
and the Eastern United States, and the existence since 1909 of the Boundary
Waters Treaty between the two nations,8' impose obvious limitations on state
action affecting the boundary waters and other waters flowing across the boundary or into the boundary waters. "The interests of the nation are more im82. U.S. Constitution Art. I, §§ 8 and 9.
83. Supra note 13.
84. Supra notes 77 and 78.
85. U.S. Constitution Art. II, § 2.
86. U.S. Constitution Art. IV.
87. 36 Stat. 2448 (1910).
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portant than those of any state,"88 and the federal government may act to prevent a state from interfering with a national treaty obligation.8 9 As in the
navigation cases, any state water law that appeared to authorize a use proscribed by the treaty would have to yield, and such a use could not be initiated,
or could not be allowed to continue, though the law stood on the books as
applicable to other waters.90 And treaty obligations of the United States give
the nation an additional basis for authorizing works of improvements on international waterways. 91
D.

General Welfare Powers

Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to levy taxes and to
92
appropriate funds to provide for the general welfare of the United States,
it was not until 1936 that it was thought that this clause delegated a separate
power to the national government. In that year United States v. Butler93 decided that the general welfare clause was not restricted by the specific powers
enumerated in the constitution, such as the power to regulate commerce. We
have seen that Congress has stretched the power over commerce to almost
unbelievable limits in grasping federal power over navigable waters, to an
extent that even the United States Supreme Court has called "strained" and
"highly fictional. ' 94 The necessity for such fictions disappeared with the Butler
case, and in United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.95 the Court said that one
of the largest federal basin-wide development projects-The Central Valley
Project in California-may be sustained under this power. "Congress has a
substantive power to tax and appropriate money for the general welfare, limited
only by the requirement that it shall be exercised for the common benefit as
distinguished from some mere local purpose. . . . Thus the power of Congress
to promote the general welfare through large-scale projects for reclamation,
irrigation, and other internal improvement, is now as clear and ample as its
power to accomplish the same results indirectly through resort to strained interpretation of the power over navigation."
The limits of this power have never been explored. However, the Gerlach
case held that property rights destroyed by the project must be taken under
eminent domain and paid for, and though the Court there relied upon specific
statutes, there is some indication in the case that the exercise of this power
does not result in the same overriding of riparian rights as does the exercise of
the power over navigation.
88. Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
89. Ibid.
90. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op.
v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946).

91.
92.
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Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
U.S. Constitution Art. I, §§ 8 and 9.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Supra note 14.
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E.

Control of Interstate Relations

The relations between the states of the union are matters of federal concern, and the United States Supreme Court is the forum for the judicial settlement of disputes between the states over the apportionment of the waters of
interstate rivers.9 6 In such disputes the Court has applied some principles of
international law,97 and has built up a significant body of interstate common
law; 98 as well as a form of federal common law that may not be the law
of either state that is a party to the dispute. 9 This law of interstate controversies
acts as a limit upon the internal law of the states, but is not strictly within the
topic of this paper because it gives no federal jurisdiction over water.
But the mechanism of the interstate lawsuit gives to the United States
an important power to operate free from the claims of the states in certain instances. Where the interstate river is one in which the United States asserts
substantial interests, the rights of the states cannot be determined without first
determining the rights of the United States. But the United States is immune
from suit. After Arizona lost its bid to block the construction of Hoover Dam, 10 0
it sought in another proceeding to establish its position within the framework
set by the Boulder Canyon Project. It sued the other states in the Colorado
River basin, asking for a decree adjudicating to it an unclouded right to the
permanent use of water, an equitable division of the privilege of future appropriation.101
The proceeding was dismissed on the ground that the United States, not
joined in the action, was an indispensable party without which the suit could
not proceed. The Court said, "The 'equitable share' of Arizona in the unappropriated water impounded above Boulder Dam could not be determined
without ascertaining the rights of the United States to dispose of the water in
aid of and support of its project to control navigation. . . .Every right which
Arizona asserts is so subordinate to and dependent upon the rights and the
exercise of an authority asserted by the United States that no final determination of one can be made without the other."
On the North Platte River the federal government has substantial interests
in the form of two Reclamation projects, indeed, the initiation of the later one
triggered the case of Nebraska v. Wyoming, 02 brought to apportion the river
between the states. Since the water rights of reclamation projects are derived
under state law, and the division of water between the states would govern the
operation of the federal projects, the United States intervened and thus waived
96. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46 (1907).
97. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
98. Ibid.
99. Hfinderlider v. La Plata and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
100. Supra note 91.
101. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 598 (1936).
102. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
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its immunity and consented to be bound by the decree. But apparently it was
felt that the federal operation of Reclamation projects on the Rio Grande
would somehow be hampered by a declaration of the rights of the states, and
when Texas sued New Mexico to enforce the Rio Grande Compact, 0 3 the
United States not only refused to intervene but successfully sought to have the
suit dismissed. Arizona is now engaged in a second suit to determine the shares
of the Colorado River basin states in the water stored in the federal projects,
and in this latest proceeding, 04 the United States has joined and is seeking
judicial aid instead of distributing the water by fiat. Seemingly, the matter
is in the hands of the Attorney General; his decision to intervene is a matter of
discretion. 0 5
The states having interests in a single river may settle their differences
by compact instead of resorting to litigation. 0 6 Such a pact will operate as a
restriction upon private rights held under state law but inconsistent with compact. 10 7 State legislation inconsistent with the compact is unconstitutional. 08
But these regional adjustments are subject to federal control, since the Constitution requires the consent of Congress to all interstate compacts. 0 9 Congress
has refuesed to consent to a flood control compact deemed inconsistent with
federal interests and responsibilities. 1 0 And since the consent of Congress
takes the form of legislation, it is subject to the veto power. President Truman
vetoed the act consenting to the original Republican River Compact, on the
ground that it would withdraw the navigation jurisdiction of the United States
over the river and would restrict the authority of the United States to construct
irrigation projects."'
III.

STATE AND FEDERAL. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Up to this point the picture looks dark for the states. Viewed as a rival,
the federal government is indeed formidable. If it chooses to act in the field
of water development it can call upon a number of powers, varied to suit the
necessities of its purposes, and its laws and activities will override any contrary
state or local laws and interests, or subordinate them to the federal purpose.
Yet except for the spectacular exceptions that get into litigation, the states do
not ordinarily see the federal government as a rival in water development. Few
federal projects are locally resisted as invasions of states' rights. On the contrary, most are welcomed, and often eagerly sought, by local people and governments.
The state is part of the nation, and its representatives in Congress help to
103. Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
104. Arizona v. California, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Cf. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).

U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 10.
Hinderlider v. La Plata and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 10.

110. Connecticut and Merrimac River Compact, (1937).
111. H.R. Doc. 690, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942).
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shape national policy. Many local and national interests will coincide. The states
will often seek the aid of the federal governmeAt in the form of projects
promising local as well as national benefits, or in the form of financial aid. The
description of federal jurisdiction over water, in the sense of power to act, does
not give anything like an accurate picture of how it operates in fact. The legislation establishing the federal agencies and authorizing them to prosecute projects is replete with procedures for consultation with the state and local authorities and for reconciling conflicts with State and local interests. In some
instances the United States gives great weight to local laws, and in every major
water development field, Congress has established mechanisms for obtaining a
local voice in planning.
A.

Express FederalRecognition of State Water Law

In many instances Congress has chosen to waive federal powers and has
written into national legislation dealing with waters or federal activities provisions for the recognition and even use by the government of state water laws.
The trend in this direction was started with reference to the western states,
where the local adoptions of the prior appropriation doctrine had made possible
the development of the early mining economy and the latter settlement of the
"Great American Desert" through irrigation. Beginning in 1866, Congress
gave its approval to the system of prior appropriation under state and local
law as a legal method of obtaining water rights on its public domain. 112 By the
Desert Land Act of 1877,113 Congress severed all the non-navigable waters on
the western public domain from the land and reserved them for the use of
the public under the laws of the states and territories, which were given "plenary
control" of the water laws applicable within their boundaries. 114 When the
federal government entered the field of irrigation development in 1902, Section
8 of the Reclamation Act provided that the Secretary of the Interior should
proceed in conformity with state laws relating to the control, appropriation, use
and distribution of water used in irrigation." 5 Since then a long series of acts
dealing with lesser programs or specific projects has contained similar language. 1" 6 This is the reason the occasional exception to this policy has created
such a furor in the west and led to the movement for the "Barrett Bill"' 1 7
that would have subjected all federal activities to state laws, and its successors
that at least would protect vested rights from federal preemption." 8
Some of these examples of federal comity have application to the eastern
112. 14 Stat. 253, Sec. 9, 43 U.S.C. 661 (1866).
113. 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. 321 (1877).
114. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
115. 32 Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C. 383 (1902).
116. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism. 45 California Law Rev. 604 (1957) contains
a list of these statutes at p. 613.
117. S. 863, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. (1957).
118. See Hearings on H.R. 4567 and others, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Congress, 1st Sess. (1959).
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sections of the United States. Within the national forests, all waters may
be used for domestic, mining, milling or irrigation purposes under the laws of
the state in which the forest is situated, or under the laws of the United States
and the rules and regulations established thereunder. 1 9 Section 9(b) of the
Federal Power Act must now be restricted in the light of the First Iowa decision, but it does require an applicant for a license to submit "satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the
state or states within which the proposed project is to be located with respect
to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion and use of water for power
purposes."' 20 While the Supreme Court has held that "satisfactory evidence"
of compliance need not include a showing that the applicant has received State
approval, at least the state laws are given consideration by the Federal Power
Commission, and Section 7 of the Act expressly disclaims an intention to
affect or interfere with the laws of the states relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other
12 1
uses, or any vested right to such uses.
The 1944 Flood Control Act expresses a policy, though not a guaranty, of
federal recognition of state interests:
"In connection with exercise of jurisdiction over the rivers of the
Nation through the construction of works of improvement, for navigation or flood control, as herein authorized, it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Congress to recognize the interests and rights of
the States in determining the development of the watersheds within
their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and control, as herein authorized, to preserve and protect to the
fullest possible extent established and potential uses, for all purposes,
of the waters of the Nation's rivers; to facilitate the consideration of
projects on a basis of comprehensive and coordinated development; and
to limit the authorization and construction of navigation works to those
in which a substantial benefit to navigation will result therefrom and
which can be operated consistently with appropriate and economic
use of the waters of such rivers by other users."' 122
This policy statement has been repeated in or made applicable to subsequent
23
Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control acts.
Congress has frequently declared certain rivers, or portions of them, to be
nonnavigable,' 2 4 thus freeing them for state control, that may take the form of
destruction of whatever navigable capabilities exist in fact. 25
119. 30 Stat.
with regulation of
(1954).
120. 41 Stat.
121. 41 Stat.

36, 16 U.S.C. 481 (1897). The United States has concerned itself only
rights of way to protect the primary forest purposes. 43 C.F.R. 244.48
1068, 16 U.S.C. 802 (1920).
1071, 16 U.S.C. 821 (1920).
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B. Corps of Engineers Projects
Federal works for the improvement of navigation and the control of floods
and their subsidiary features for hydroelectric power production, are primarily
the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. Its civil works staff
has historically been considered as a consulting body to Congress, in the initiation of projects, and the executive agency for carrying out congressional directives in the construction stages.' 26 The amount of state participation in
project planning cannot be given by simply reciting the statutory requirements.
Since the procedures of the Corps are quite complex, a description of them is
7
necessary.12
The first step in a project is the reconnaissance report, individually initiated
by Congress in the current omnibus river and harbor or flood control bill,
usually after local groups or officials have interested their congressman or
senator in the stream improvement. The district engineer in whose territory
the stream is located arranges for public hearings at which all persons having
an interest are privileged to attend. Members of Congress, state and local officials, representatives of interest groups, and others may testify to the character
and extent of the improvement desired and the need and advisability of its
execution.
After a field reconnaissance of the area, a preliminary report to the Board
of Engineers on the probable justification for the project is made by the District
Engineer, and if his report is unfavorable, he issues a public notice stating that
all parties have the privilege of a written or oral appeal to the Board of Engineers. The Board reviews the report and submits a recommendation to the
Chief of Engineers, and again, if his recommendation is unfavorable, state and
local interests may appear before the Chief of Engineers.
The Chief reports an unfavorable recommendation to Congress, and submits his report to the states in which the project is located, but if he approves
the project a more detailed survey is undertaken, following the same procedural
steps as the reconnaissance, with the same possibilities of hearings and appeals.
The survey report is submitted to the states and any comments received from
the States are appended to the report when it reaches Congress. Public hearings
are then held before the Public Works Committees of the Senate and House
when the project comes up for authorization. Other congressional hearings are
possible when funds are appropriated for project construction.
In addition to these many opportunities to make the position of the states
known and to urge its adoption or consideration by the Corps or by Congress,
the states may, to the extent deemed practicable by the Chief of Engineers,
126.

Maas, Muddy Waters, 19 (1951).

127. Statutory authorizations are found in 16 U.S.C. 541, 542, 701, 701-(1)(a) Maas,
Muddy Waters, 21-36 (1951) analyzes the actual processes of the Corps, Water Resources
Law (1950) collects the legal and statutory requirements, and a step by step presentation
of a typical case is found in Hearings, Subcommittee to Study Civil Works, 74-77, 82d
Cong. 2d Sess. No. 82-16 (1952). The following is condensed from all these sources.
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cooperate in the investigation and actually participate in the formulation of
project plans.
C.

Federal Power Commission Licenses

A state voice (though not always a successful one, as we have seen) is
guaranteed in all Federal Power Commission proceedings for licensing private
power developments, by a provision of the act requiring notice of applications
28
to be given to any state or municipality likely to be interested or affected.'
Consideration of state interests seems implicit in the admonition to the Commission to choose projects "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving
or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or
foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of waterpower develop29
ment, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes.'
Furthermore, applicants for licenses come within the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and must comply with its requirements for consultation with
the head of the state agency concerned with wildlife resources, with a view to
preventing loss of and damage to those resources. 3°
State policies favoring public power developed at the local level are
fostered by Section 7 of the Federal Power Act requiring the Commission to
give preference to applications of states and municipalities for licenses, 31 and by
Section 14 preserving the rights of states and municipalities to take over and
operate any licensed project by condemnation proceedings and the payment of
just compensation.' 32 .
Two of the recent disputes between the states and the F.P.C. have been
over the protection to be given to fish.' 33 In neither case did the Commission
ride roughshod over the state's recreational interests and allow the fishing to be
destroyed. It did disagree with the state's opinion that the dams would destroy
the migratory runs of salmon and steelhead, but it conditioned the licenses on
the inclusion of what have been termed "gold plated" fish protection devices,
costing four million dollars in one case and seven million in the other.
D.

Department of Agriculture Programs

The Department of Agriculture has gone the farthest of any federal agency
in recognizing state water law and water rights and operating within their
framework. This is probably due to two factors, the Department operates primarily on the principle of direct relations with farmers and landowners, and
it is concerned in the area of the small stream and watershed, rather than with
the large and navigable main stem.
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The program of the Soil Conservation Service, which was first directed
toward control of soil erosion and flood protection,'18 4 was augmented by the
Agricultural Conservation Program, which added the objectives of water conservation and the beneficial use of water on individual farms, including measures
to prevent runoff, the building of check dams and ponds, and facilities for
applying water to the land. 135 The Service conducts surveys, investigations, and
research, and channels financial and technical assistance to the landowners
through soil conservation districts created under state law.180
The Department of Agriculture also has important flood control duties.
The 1936 Flood Control Act provided that it should investigate watersheds and
measures for runoff and water-flow retardation and soil erosion prevention, 8 7
and the 1938 act authorized works of improvement along these lines. 1 88 This
authorization has also been prosecuted through the mechanism of benefits to
soil conservation districts. 39 Although the Secretary of Agriculture is not bound
by the requirements of the 1944 Flood Control Act providing for transmitting
a copy of proposed project reports to the affected states,'14 0 he has administratively adopted that practice where the Soil Conservation Service proposes an
14 1
accelerated regional program that can be likened to a project.
In addition to these grants in aid to or through soil conservation districts,
the Water Facilities Act makes available loans to farmers for the construction
1 42
of ponds, reservoirs and other facilities for water storage and utilization.
These programs for the most part envisage small individual projects and
works on the farmer's land, and the water rights involved are of course those of
the farmer, obtained under state law. In some instances title to small flood
control works and water supply reservoirs belongs to the soil conservation districts, and again only state water rights are involved.
In 1954 the Hope-Aitken Small Watersheds Act, or "Public Law 566,"
as it is often called, 143 was enacted to fill the gap between these programs, which
emphasized land treatment and very small individual structures, and the program of the Corps of Engineers, with its emphasis on large dams on the main
stems. As supplemented by the 1956 Poague Amendment, 144 this act provides
for financial and technical assistance to state and local agencies in the construction of multipurpose projects for flood control and the conservation, development, utilization and disposal of water in watersheds up to 250,000 acres.
The federal government assumes up to $250,000 of the cost of flood preven134.
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tion features and loans the local agency the balance, up to $5,000,000. Dams
may be constructed that will impound 25,000 acre feet, including 5,000 acre
feet of floodwater detention, and even larger projects are possible with the
approval of Congress and other interested agencies.
Such middlesized water control works, having for their purposes flood control, recreational use, and water supply for irrigation, municipal and industrial
uses, will obviously have an important effect on the smaller streams of the
states. But the United States neither takes nor grants water rights for these
projects, the act requires the local organization to acquire or provide assurance
that the landowners or water users have acquired pursuant to state law, such
water rights as are needed. 145 The state planning function is similarly safeguarded; any application for assistance under the act must be approved by the
state agency having supervisory control over such projects, or by the governor
if there is no such agency.' 41
E. Water Supply
The federal government, in its water resource programs in the eastern
states, has taken an increasing interest in water supply problems. In 1936 the
Secretary of the Army was authorized to provide additional storage capacity in
flood control reservoirs for domestic water supply or other conservation storage,
and they
when the cost of the increased storage is contributed by local agencies
147
agree to utilize it in a manner consistent with the federal purposes.
The 1944 Flood Control Act authorized the secretary to make contracts
with states, municipalities, private concerns or individuals for providing surplus
water for domestic and industrial uses.' 48 The increasing interest in irrigation
in the east, as a means of preventing drought damage and of increasing yields
by properly timed water application, has stimulated federal activity along
these lines. The Corps of Engineers, in cooperation with the Department of
Agriculture, is investigating irrigation potentialities in the Delaware, Potomac,
and lower Mississippi valleys, and presumably, if conditions so warrant, reserconstruction that make provision for
voirs will be recommended for federal
49
storage to meet irrigation demands.
The Small Watersheds (Hope-Aitken) Act provides aid to local groups
for construction of reservoirs that may include capacity for municipal, industrial
and irrigation supply. As noted above, the water rights for the latter are obtained under state law,150 but the status of water rights for the Corps' projects
are not clear. Perhaps a city or irrigation enterprise would partake of the federal
right to control the navigable waters; perhaps their water rights are derived
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

68 Stat. 667, 16 U.S.C. 1004 (1954).

68 Stat. 666, 16 U.S.C. 1003 (1954).
50 Stat. 515, 33 U.S.C. 701(h) (1950).
58 Stat. 890, 33 U.S.C. 708 (1944).

Fox, National Water Resources Policy Issues, 22 Law and Contemporary Prob-

lems, 472, 485 (1957).
150. Supra note 145.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
from state law, and the users simply utilize the federal storage works. The
matter could stand clarification. While present withdrawals for these purposes
are miniscule, they will undoubtedly increase, and if substantial amounts of
water come to be impounded to maintain low flows for sewage and pollution
dilution, the situation might get serious.
F. Fish and Wildlife, Recreation
The Secretary of the Interior can acquire large areas of land and water
for purposes of establishing migratory bird and other wildlife refuges, and has
the power to construct dams, dikes, ditches and other water control works for
the benefit of the refuge.1 51 Presumably any water rights necessary for the
project are asserted under the proprietary power and the Pelton doctrine, 15 2
and present potential areas of conflict with state plans for and rights in the
water. However, the head of the state fish and game department is made a voting
member of the commission that must approve such refuges.
Wildlife restoration projects, as distinguished from refuges, are also constructed by the Secretary, but with the active cooperation of the states, and any
construction work on such projects is performed in accordance with state laws. 163
Federal projects having for their primary purpose the control of navigation
or floods, or the production of power, often have secondary or subsidiary features
for the protection and enhancement of fish and wildlife habitat and recreational
opportunities. State conservation departments must be consulted concerning
the effects of these projects on fish and wildlife resources, with a view to preventing loss or damage to those resources.154 These wildlife habitat development
programs on federal water development projects are jointly planned by the
Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service and the state departments,
and generally result in turning over the completed facilities and recreational
areas to the state agencies for supervision and administration.' 5
CONCLUSION

Looking at "jurisdiction" in the sense of "power to act," the federal government seems to have almost unlimited jurisdiction over water: whenever a
federal interest of any sort arises, it has the power to deal with the water to
further that interest. This is not limited by any concept of "territorial jurisdiction"; it is not possible to divide up the country into areas and give the states
power in some and the federal government power in others. Although navigation
is the most commonly used federal power, it is not possible to identify the
navigable waters and the head of navigation on each and say that the federal
government has jurisdiction of a particular stream, but just to a particular point.
The power of the states to act in the absence of federal regulation and develop151. 45 Stat. 1222, 16 U.S.C. 715 (1929).
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ment, and the facts of the hydrologic cycle, the physical interdependence of
water, will not permit this. Furthermore, federal navigational interests extend
beyond the head of navigation, and federal proprietary and war powers may
affect even ground waters. 156 Nor is it possible to identify legal areas and say
that a certain type of legislation is for the state, another is for the United
States. State property rights may affect navigation, federal navigation regulation may destroy property rights.
Nevertheless there is some division between things local and things national, and the states have much room left to them for state action based on
what is deemed best for the state, independently of any national considerations.
The federal government may be omnipotent, but it is not omnipresent. Since the
federal jurisdiction is a conditional one, it may be ignored when the federal
interest is not present or is not being exercised.
When federal and state interests do overlap, the United States seldom acts
in a highhanded and overbearing manner. The American federation of states
is a fairly good compromise for achieving the greatest freedom for states to
deal with local problems while at the same time reserving to the federal government power to accomplish national objectives.
The cooperative and coordinative procedures set out above have been
concessions to state and local interests that have been evolved to permit the
interplay of governments and the balancing of State and national interests.
The procedures of the federal agencies that have water resource development
programs are designed to give the states a voice in those programs. At least
the states have the chance to object that a state policy is violated, and to
demonstrate its values. If private rights are to be destroyed, if public rights
to fishing and recreation will be lost, these procedures provide an assurance
that the destroyed values will be weighed against the federal advantages and
counted as costs of the project. But local quirks and parochial laws will not
be allowed to block federal projects where the federal agency's views are
that these have little value or that their values can be otherwise attained.
And an occasional imbalance between local costs and local benefits will not
be allowed to stand in the way of large regional or national benefits. Still,
considering the magnitude of the federal water program in the last half century
it is surprising how few conflicts have arisen.
Some have seen the federal agencies armed with federal supremacy as the
agents of the destruction of states' rights and the imposition of bureaucratic control over unwilling people. s1 7 Others view the federal program as the only
logical solution to national problems of security and economic welfare affecting
all the people of all the United States, transcending local opposition to general
welfare measures and overruling sectional rivalries. 158 This is politics, not law,
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and such issues are outside the scope of this study. It has been argued that the
states should have a stronger voice in the federal program, perhaps a vote
on a regional agency.' 59 There seems to be a strong possibility that the insecurity of private water rights resulting from the existence of the navigation
servitude and the exercise of proprietary powers may be removed. Although the
"Barret Bill" that would have subjected all federal water activity to state
law had little chance of passage,'0 milder legislation that will require payment
for vested rights destroyed by the exercise of these powers is not resisted by the
agencies and the administration.13 '
As new problems arise from stepped-up state and federal activities in
water projects, new methods of compromise and consultation can be expected to
result. The dominance of the federal government is due only in part to its
constitutional powers; most of it is due to the dominant position of the United
States as financier and planner. It has been suggested that if the states wish a
stronger voice in the national water development area, they will get it in proportion to the amount they increase their financial contributions, and as fast as
they devise responsible state agencies capable of policy formulation and project
management, free from undue pressures from local special interests. 0 2
159. Missouri: Land and Water 12 (1953) (Minority Report). See proposed InterstateFederal Compact for the Delaware River Basin, Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee,
Philadelphia (1961).
160. S. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearings, Subcommittee on Irrigation and
Reclamation 7 (1959).
161. Sato, Water Resources, the Federal-State Relationship, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 43 (1960).
162. Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 Law and Contemporary Problems 325 (1957).

